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With around 50% of the urban men between age 15 and 30 unemployed, Ethiopia has 
one of the highest unemployment rates worldwide. This paper describes the nature of 
unemployment among young men in urban Ethiopia.  We analyse the determinants of 
incidence and duration and find that most variables have the same effect on both.   
Unemployment is concentrated among relatively well-educated first time job seekers 
who come from the middle classes.   Mean duration of unemployment is close to four 
years and is higher for those aspiring to a public sector job.      The unemployed have 
realistic reservation wages. Those living in Addis are less likely to become 
unemployed, and ethnicity has no effect.  We find that both the incidence and duration 
of unemployment are negatively related to household welfare.  Since we cannot reject 
that the latter is endogenous, this suggests that households use their savings and cut 
back consumption to cope with unemployment. 
Those with a father working as a civil servant have shorter durations, suggesting that 
this provides an information advantage.  The medium of job search also has a strong 
effect indicating that information is costly.  Social networks only help after one has 
become unemployed. Our results are robust to changes in the macro environment.  We 
explain why people do not take up a job while waiting in unemployment.   
 
 
JEL classification: J64, O18, R23 
Keywords:  unemployment, youth, duration, urban labour market, Ethiopia 
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The man asks whether he will be allowed in. 






1.  Introduction 
 
Although unemployment in developing countries has received considerable attention, 
its treatment in the literature lags far behind that of unemployment in industrialised 
countries.  With the increased availability of micro-data, more empirical work is 
emerging.
2 Most of this work investigates the incidence but not the duration of 
unemployment 
3   This paper is an empirical investigation of the nature of 
unemployment in urban Ethiopia. In the mid nineties, urban Ethiopia had one of the 
highest unemployment rates worldwide.   In 1994, 34% percent of the male work force 
was unemployed. It was especially concentrated among the young: 50% of men under 
30 were in unemployment.   In the next paragraph we discuss the data.  In section 3 we 
investigate the incidence; section 4 looks at the duration of unemployment.   Section 5 
summarises and concludes. 
 
2.  Data Description 
 
We use the first round (1994) from the Ethiopian Urban Socio-Economic Survey 
(EUSES) household data collected by the Economics Department of Addis Ababa 
                                                 
2 see for example Glewwe (1987), Tunali and Assaad (1992), Horton et al. (1994), Dickens and Lang 
(1996), Assaad (1997), Manning and Junkar (1998), Kingdon and Knight (2000, 2001) Rama (1998, 
1999), Aly and Shields (1999) 
3 The wto are needed to truly capture the nature of unemployment. The US for example has historically a 
low incidence (4%) but a long duration (around 100 days), implying that unemployment is borne by a 
small number of people.  Spain in the early nineties on the other hand, had one of the largest OECD 
unemployment rates (22%), but mean duration was much shorter (closer to 50 days) (see Katz (1986); 
Bergstrom and Edin (1992); Bentolila and Ichino (2000).      3  
 
University in co-operation with Göteborg University.   The survey collected data on a 
random sample of 1500 households in the 7 largest towns.
4 Table 1 gives some more 
descriptive statistics.   
 
Table 1: Descriptive statistics for men between age 15 and 60 
   
Sample size   
   Number of households  1,500 
   Number of men above 15  2,567 
   
Employment distribution (of active men only)    
   Public sector  27% 
   Formal private sector  7% 
   Self employment, casual workers and informal private sector  33% 
   Unemployed  34% 
   
Age   
   15-30  63% 
   Beyond 30  37% 
   
Median real earnings per month (1994 PPP USD)
5  
Public sector employee:   
   International Organisation   126 
   Civil servants  83 
   Public sector enterprise employee  66 
Private sector wage employee  44 
Self-employed   26 
Casual workers  38 
Co-operative worker  33 
   
Household characteristics   
   Average number of household members  6 
   Average number of household members that is unemployed   1 
   Average monthly total household expenditures per capita (in 1994 PPP USD)  25 
   Average monthly food household expenditures per capita (in 1994 PPP USD)  18 
   Average value of household assets per household member (in 1994 PPP USD)  289 
   
 
The urban labour market in Ethiopia is dominated by the public sector, which employs 
roughly one third of the adult men.  Another third works as self-employed.  The formal 
private sector employs less than 10%, a direct consequence of the policies of the 
ancient regime, which ensured that most medium and large-scale enterprises were 
under government control. Private firms were explicitly restricted in size and were not 
                                                 
4 900 households in Addis, 125 in Dire Dawa, 100 households in Bahir Dar, Dessie, Jimma and Mekele 
and 75 households in Awassa.  A more detailed overview of the sample can be obtained from the author. 
5 In 1994 the exchange rate of the Ethiopian Birr (ETB) with the USD, corrected for purchasing power 
parity was 0.21875.  One PPP dollar is worth 1.75 its equivalent in USD [World Bank (2000)], and the 
exchange rate is 8 ETB to 1 USD.     4  
 
allowed in all sectors.
6  We observe two earning groups: relatively high earnings 
associated with jobs in international organizations, civil service, and public and private 
sector employment; and lower earnings associated with self-employment, casual work 
and co-operative work.   The gap in wages is quite high and may suggest a 
segmentation of the labour market in good and bad jobs (see Saint-Paul 1996), as we 
will discuss.   Ethiopia has no unemployment benefit system and the unemployed rely 
mostly on the household.  On average 1 household member out of 6 is unemployed.   
Average consumption per household member is 25 USD, which is below 1 USD per 
day.
7  70% of the household budget is spent on food.  The mean value of household 
assets, excluding dwellings, is 289 USD.  
 
We focus our analysis on young men between age 15 and 30.  The lower boundary is 
determined by the fact that formal employment is illegal below the age of 15 and we 
find very observations.  The upper boundary is chosen because beyond 30, 
unemployment in is at a sustained and significant lower level.
8  Table 2 reports 
descriptive statistics for these young active men.
9  Their education levels are relatively 
high: 87% have completed at least primary education while almost two thirds have 
finished junior secondary schoolor higher.  Only 5% of the young men are married.  
Over 50% are unemployed. 
 
 
                                                 
6 At the start of the reforms public enterprises accounted for about 60% of employment and more than 
80% of value added in the manufacturing sector alone.  The state also dominated the construction, 
wholesale trade and transport sectors (Mengistae and Teal 1998). 
7   From nationally representative data we know that average food expenditure per capita for the whole of 
Ethiopia is around 12 USD per month [Source: Dercon (1997) and own calculations] This means that our 
sample contains less-poor households, which is what one expects from a sample that is restricted to the 7 
largest towns.   
8 Using a t-test, we find that unemployment at age 30 is significantly different from unemployment 
beyond age 30; while unemployment at age 31 is no longer significantly different from unemployment 
beyond age 31.   
9 excluding students, who represent 40% of all young men    5  
 
 
Table 2: Descriptive statistics for young men aged between 15 and 30  
   
Highest Level of Education   
   None   13% 
   Primary education  14% 
   Junior secondary education  36% 
   Senior secondary education  31% 
   Tertiary education  6% 
   
Family situation   
   Married  5% 
   
Employment distribution  active only 
   Public sector  15% 
   Private sector wage employment  7% 
   Self employment, casual workers and informal private sector  27% 
   Unemployed  51% 
   
   
   
 
A key issue is how we measure unemployment.  Respondents were asked to describe 
their main activity.
10  Once the main activity is known, a list of questions was asked.  
The level of detail of the questions makes it impossible to pretend to be unemployed (or 
working).  A number of control questions were also incorporated.   We have 
information on two types of unemployment: those ‘looking for work but unable to find 
any’, and those ‘not in paid work and not looking for work’. There is discussion on 
whether those who are not looking for work should be considered as unemployed [see 
Flinn and Heckman (1983)].  We count them as unemployed.  Given the high 
unemployment rates, it is not unlikely that job searching is passive and that people are 
waiting, rather than actively looking for a job, as argued for Kingdon and Knight 
(1999) for South Africa.  We also find indications that job searching takes place 
through social networks, which may further induce waiting behaviour.   However, none 
of our results are sensitive to this (broad) definition.  The unemployed who are ‘not at 
paid work and not looking for work’ only represent 6% of the unemployed, implying a 
                                                 
10 The enumerator then selected one of the 25 categories that best described the respondent’s activity.  If 
needed, a new category could be added.      6  
 
difference between the narrow and broad unemployment rate of less than 2%.  We also 
find that the two categories do not differ in their main characteristics.
11 
How do we measure unemployment duration?  For thosew who are working we have a 
direct observation (in months): they are asked how long their last spell of 
unemployment had lasted.  Unfortunately, in the first round of the survey the 
unemployed themselves were not asked how long they had been unemployed. 
However, we can construct a measure of duration for them.
12   In brief, we predict the 
age at which schooling was completed for the unemployed, taking a selectivity bias 
into account, using 6 different models.
13  We then construct the measure of duration as 
follows as: Unemployment duration = Age – time working – estimated age at 
completing education. From the 6 obtained measures of duration we select the most 
reliable one.  In a later round of the survey we include a question for the currently 
unemployed and ask the unemployed directly how long they had been unemployed. We 
obtain a mean duration that is very close (and not signifcantly different) to the 
constructed one (42 versus 45 months) and that follows a similar distribution.  A 
detailed 13 page description of the methodlogy to construct duration measure can be 
asked on simple request.  
                                                 
11 The interested reader will notice that we carefully avoid the notion involuntary unemployment in this 
paper.  The reason is that we do not believe it to be a terribly illuminating concept. As Berry and Sabot 
(1978) suggest, and Layard, Nickel and Jackman (1991) argue, in a segmented labour market, the 
unemployed are both at once.  They are involuntary unemployed in the sense that they are willing to 
work at the going wage in the primary sector, but cannot find a job; and they are voluntary unemployed 
in the sense that they are not willing to work in the secondary sector at the going wage.  In most 
economies there are always some bad jobs available. Does this mean that all the unemployed are 
voluntary unemployed?  The neoclassical approach to see it as a choice does not seem to fit reality; but 
neither does the Keynesian approach, which regards the unemployed as excluded from the labour force, 
fit the picture.  Some would prefer to combine the two and call it quasi-voluntary unemployment (see 
Edwards 1987), which does not illuminate the discussion either. One of the areas for future research is 
precisely to unravel why people do not want certain jobs, even while waiting or searching for a better job 
in unemployment.   
12 There are three reasons why this is relevant. First, considering completed unemployment spells only 
would lead to a selection bias because those who remain unemployed would be excluded.  Second, 
completed spells only reflect past unemployment.  Third, by also taking the currently unemployed into 
account, we obtain more observations which allows for a more robust analysis. 
13 In many early analysis of unemployment duration in OECD countries,  the measure was constructed as 
age – work experience – year of schooling – 6.  This is inaccurate for developing countries because many 
finish school late.     7  
 
 
3.  The Incidence of Unemployment 
3.1.  Who are the unemployed? 
 
Figure 1 plots the incidence of unemployment against age to illustrate the concentration 
of unemployment among the young.  The graph reaches a peak at age 19 and falls after 
age 20. Only beyond age 30 does it reach a constant level.    
 




























The descriptive statistics in Table 3 give us further information on who the unemployed 
young men are.   Only 6% of them are not looking for a job, so the vast majority is 
willing to work at the going wages.  The majority are first time job seekers; they have 
never worked before. This is similar to other developing countries
14, and may be an 
important distinctive characteristic from unemployment in industrialised countries, 
where movements in and out of unemployment are more frequent [see Layard et al 
(1990)].  Half of the young men are looking for a job in the public sector while almost 
                                                 
14 see for example Glewwe (1989), Dickens and Lang (1996) and Rama (1998) for Sri Lanka; Rama 
(1999) for Tunisia; Manning and Junankar (1998) for Indonesia; and Tenjo (1990) for Colombia    8  
 
two thirds are looking for a job with a relatively high wage (public sector and private 
sector wage employment).  Comparing these aspirations with the actual distribution of 
jobs in the youth labour market indicates that the public sector attracts more candidates 
than it can offer places.  While 13% aspire to a job in a public enterprise, the sector 
employs only 9% of the working male young adults.
15   
 
  Table 3: Descriptive statistics for young unemployed men 
  Young unemployed 
(age 15-30) 
   
Looking for Work?   
    Looking for work but unable to find any   0.94 
    Not at paid work and not looking for work  0.06 
   
Ever worked before?   
    No  0.85 
    Yes  0.15 
   
Job looking for:   
     Public sector  0.50 
     Private sector wage employment  0.13 
     Self-employment, casual work and informal private sector work  0.14 
     Any work  0.23 
   
Ever refused a job?   
    Have never refused a job   0.98 
    Have ever refused job   0.02 
   
Reservation wage ( 1994 PPP USD)
16  
    Mean  41 
    Standard deviation  28 
    
    Minimum  0 
    Median  33 
    Maximum  197 
 
Medium for search     
    Through friends, relatives, church, ethnic associations  0.40 
    Through government employment agency   0.15 
    Through advertisements  0.40 
    Asked prospective employer  0.05 
   
   
How support yourself while unemployed   
    Through parents’ help   0.84 
    Small occasional jobs  0.12 
    Through help from friends, spouse, own savings or loan from relative  0.04 
   
 
                                                 
15 The difference is even more outspoken for civil servants: while 37% hope to get employed as a civil 
servant, only 20% will actually get such a job.   
16 For the exchange rate see Footnote 5    9  
 
 
Since the public sector is expected to contract, rather than expand, young men 
overestimate their chances of getting a public sector job.  This is not uncommon; 
psychological research finds that youngsters typically perform poorer that adults in 
decision making. 
17  The poor performance is also obvious from a game theoretical 
perspective.  Considering a career as a dynamic game, the transition from school to 
work is the very first stage of the game, and young men have never played the game 
before, so they have not had a chance to test their beliefs and revise them appropriately.  
An alternative explanation is that young people take higher risks.  Evidence suggests 
that youngsters are indeed less risk averse.
18  In our data we find little evidence that 
young people are risk loving:  98% of the young unemployed have never refused a job.  
We also find little evidence for unrealistic reservation wages: the median reservation 
wages is below that of a young casual worker (compare with figures in Table 4).   
 
Table 3 also shows that the most used media for job searching are social networks and 
consulting advertisements.  When we compare this with how working young men found 
their job (see Table 4), it becomes clear that the unemployed focus too much on 
advertisements and not enough on approaching the employer directly.  Note that search 
through the government employment agency, on which the official unemployment 
figures are based, represents only 15% of the young male unemployed.
19   We also find 
                                                 
17 Psychological research finds that adults outperform youths, especially younger adolescents (12-15 
years) in decision making competence measures such as consideration of all options, risks, and long term 
consequences  (Halpern-Felsher and Cauffman 2000).  The reason is that they have poor information 
about the market and about themselves.   
18 For an overview see Gruber (2001).  
19 The Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs (MoLSA) has a division in each region, concerned with 
matching labour supply and demand.   Although reporting is not compulsory, neither for job seekers nor 
for employers, this is the source for official unemployment figures, published by the Ministry of Labour 
and Social Affairs (MLSA) and used to determine government policy.  However, not only do these 
figures represent just a fraction of the unemployed, changes in the figure do not necessarily reflect 
changes in actual unemployment.  The early nineties for example are believed to be characterised by a 
sharp increase in unemployment, while this rise may well reflect an increase in reporting due to increased 
confidence in the new government.     10 
 
that the unemployed get most of their support from their parents.  In the next sections 
we discuss the determinants of the probability of being unemployed. 
 
Table 4: Descriptive statistics for young working  men 
  Young employed 
(age 15-30) 
   
Wage (1994 PPP USD)
20   
    Median  44 
   
    Mean  58 
    Standard deviation  53 
   
    Minimum  2 
    Maximum  551 
   
Median real earnings per month (1994 PPP USD)
21  
Public sector employee:   
   International Organisation   91 
   Civil servants  61 
   public sector enterprise employee  59 
Formal private sector employee   
   private sector enterprise employee  42 
Informal private sector    
   Self-employed   45 
   Casual workers  37 
   Co-operative worker  28 
   Domestic worker  9 
   
   
   
Medium through which job is found   
    Through friends, relatives, church, ethnic associations  0.33 
    Through government employment agency   0.19 
    Through advertisements  0.26 
    Asked prospective employer  0.22 
   
 
 
3.2.  Individual characteristics 
 
Table 5 shows the marginal effects for a probit on unemployment for young men.  The 
model only includes exogenous variables.  We test the model for homoscedasticity and 
normality using a conditional moment test (Pagan and Vella 1989) and it passes both.  
Age has a positive effect indicating that the relatively older young men are more likely 
to be unemployed.  Up to senior secondary education, one is more likely to be 
                                                 
20 See Footnote 5. 
21 See Footnote 5.     11 
 
unemployed the higher one’s level of education. Tertiary education is insignificant, 
which indicates that having a university degree no longer ensures one will get a job.
22  
Ethnic origin has no significant influence, whatever ethnic variable we put in, rejecting 
the belief that unemployment is lower among the Gurage, who are traditionally 
associated with trade and self-employment; or among the Tigray, who are strongly 
represented in the current government.   
 
Table 5: Probit young unemployed men with exogenous variables only (marginal effects) 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
  unemployed  unemployed  unemployed  unemployed 
Age 0.161  0.151  0.162  0.153 
 (0.060)**  (0.060)*  (0.060)**  (0.060)* 
Age squared  -0.004  -0.004  -0.004  -0.004 
 (0.001)**  (0.001)**  (0.001)**  (0.001)** 
Primary is highest level of education   0.136  0.134  0.134  0.150 
 (0.080)+  (0.080)+  (0.080)+  (0.079)+ 
Junior secondary is highest level of education   0.252  0.251  0.251  0.274 
 (0.069)**  (0.069)**  (0.069)**  (0.068)** 
Senior secondary is highest level of education   0.384  0.389  0.383  0.413 
 (0.061)**  (0.061)**  (0.061)**  (0.060)** 
Tertiar is highest level of education   0.148  0.155  0.151  0.176 
 (0.095)  (0.095)  (0.094)  (0.093)+ 
Amhara 0.049  0.046  0.060  0.063 
 (0.043)  (0.043)  (0.042)  (0.042) 
Ln(bmi) -0.142    -0.139  -0.137 
 (0.116)    (0.115)  (0.116) 
Height for age    -0.039     
   (0.030)     
Years of schooling mother  0.010  0.010  0.012  0.015 
 (0.007)  (0.007)  (0.007)+  (0.007)* 
Father works in formal sector wage work   0.107  0.107     
 (0.048)*  (0.048)*     
Father works in civil service       0.091   
     (0.053)+   
Father works as self-employed         -0.083 
       (0.047)+ 
Living in Addis   -0.119  -0.120  -0.123  -0.127 
 (0.045)**  (0.045)**  (0.045)**  (0.045)** 
Observations 679  679  679  679 
Robust standard errors in parentheses         
+ significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% 
 
 
                                                 
22 During the previous regime, the tertiary educated were guaranteed a job in the public sector, but this 
was abolished in 1991.      12 
 
3.3.  Household background  
 
Health, as measured by the logarithm of the Body Mass Index has a negative effect, but 
is insignificant.  Because the variable may be endogenous
23, and we do not have 
convincing instruments for individual health, we replace it by height for age. This 
variable is reflects long term nutrition health, accumulated over the years, which is 
exogenous.  Height for age has a smaller but still insignificant effect, indicating no link 
between urban unemployment and nutrition health, as suggested  by efficiency wages 
models.
24    It also suggests that physical appearance of health (height or body mass 
index), is not used as a sorting device by employers.   As we will see, this result is 
independent from the job aspired to, or the welfare of the individual’s household.    
 
Our results confirm the finding by Krishnan (1996) that household background is 
important for labour market performance in urban Ethiopia.  Table 5  shows that 
mother’s education may play a role, although the coefficient is limited in size and its 
significance is low and unstable. The father’s profession, on the other hand, has a 
strong and significant effect that is robust for different specifications of the model.   As 
we can see in column 1 of Table 5, young men with a father working as a formal sector 
wage worker are more likely to be unemployed.  In columns two and three we replace 
this variable by a father working as civil servant and as self-employed respectively, the 
two dominant types of work.  This shows that the effect comes mainly from fathers 
who are civil servants.  Having a self-employed father has a negative effect on a young 
man’s chances to become unemployed.  However, when we introduce household 
                                                 
23 If the missing income of the unemployed would represent an important part of the household’s income, 
unemployment may cause a lower body mass index.   
24 see Leibenstein (1957), Dasgupta  (1993) and Dasgupta and Ray (2000).    13 
 
welfare (see below), the effect becomes insignificant, indicating that this is a welfare 
effect.   
 
Table 5 also shows that young men living in Addis Ababa are less likely to become 
unemployed relative to those living in other towns.  This suggests that even if 
youngsters have migrated to Addis, they are still more likely to find a job than in any of 
the provincial towns.   
 
Household welfare is not included in the model in Table 5 because it is potentially 
endogenous.  But we expect it to play an important role because unemployment 
duration is long and Ethiopia has no unemployment benefit system while the majority 
of young men are supported by their parents during unemployment.  We consider two 
proxies for household welfare: assets and consumption.  The first is measured by the 
mean value of household assets per household member and can be interpreted as a 
measure of household savings; the second is measured by per capita consumption per 
month, although we obtain the same results when we use food consumption, measured 
per capita or per adult equivalent.  Table 6 shows that the unemployed come from 
households with lower household welfare, whichever indicator we use.  
 
Table 6:  T-test on the difference in means between employed and unemployed for potentially 
endogenous variables indicating welfare 
   













Mean value of household assets per hh member (USD)
 25 221  529  0.001 
Total consumption per capita per month (USD)   21  26  0.001 
Food consumption per adult equivalent  per month (USD)  16  20  0.000 
      
                                                 
25 see Footnote 5 
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When we test formally whether each of these variables is individually omitted from the 
model in Table 5, we find that they are (the p-values for a score test are below 0.008 for 
assets, consumption or food consumption).   We also find, using a conditional moment 
test for endogeneity (Stewart 1998) that both variables are endogenous (p-values for 
score test are blewo 0.002).  We therefore run an instrumental variable probit where 
household assets and household consumption are instrumented for.  
26  The results for 
the second stage regression are shown in Table 7.   A Hausman test indicates that the 
results of the instrumental variable model are not different from the model without 
instruments, so endogeneity does not bias the results.   Although the two welfare 
variables are not highly correlated (0.33), we include them separately as well as 
together. Both variables have a significant negative effect. This confirms that the 
unemployed come from households with relatively lower household welfare.  The 
effects of the other variables remain largely the same, with three important 
observations: (i) primary education has become insignificant; (ii) mother’s education 
has become significant, and still has only a small effect; and (iii) father’s profession is 
now insignificant, indicating that its effect was mostly a household welfare effect.   
 
The dominant view in the economic literature is that unemployment in developing 
countries is concentrated among the better off.  It is a luxury (Udall and Sinclair 1982) 
and a ‘bourgeois phenomenon’ (Myrdal 1968).  However, there is very little empirical 
evidence for this.  Our results suggest that the ubran poor are more likely to be 
unemployed in urban Ethiopia.  To study whether the effect is inverse U-shaped we 
included squared terms of household welfare, but this only renders the effect of these 
variables insignificant.   
                                                 
26 To select the instruments, we start from a general model of household welfare.  We then compare their 
correlation with unemployment with their correlation with asset value and consumption and select those 
instruments which are highly correlated with last but lowly correlated with the former.     15 
 
 
Table 7: Instrumental variable probit unemployment of young men (marginal effects) 
  (1) (2) (3) 
  unemployed  unemployed  unemployed 
Age    0.17303 0.11764 0.17796 
 (0.07860)*  (0.07723)  (0.08335)* 
Age  squared  -0.00425 -0.00308 -0.00436 
 (0.00166)*  (0.00164)+  (0.00177)* 
Primary is highest level of education   0.09991  0.12837  0.08811 
  (0.10101) (0.10274) (0.10866) 
Junior secondary is highest level of education   0.20624  0.25286  0.21171 
 (0.08702)*  (0.08377)**  (0.09073)* 
Senior secondary is highest level of education   0.34268  0.38468  0.34989 
 (0.07753)**  (0.07865)**  (0.08418)** 
Tertiary is highest level of education   0.11348  0.17088  0.12002 
  (0.11901) (0.11717) (0.12614) 
Amhara  0.03384 0.02261 0.03487 
  (0.05432) (0.05426) (0.05543) 
Ln(bmi)  -0.11117 -0.12278 -0.10769 
  (0.15595) (0.15696) (0.15939) 
Years of schooling mother  0.01788  0.02053  0.01842 
  (0.00877)* (0.00912)* (0.00930)* 
Father works in formal sector wage work   0.04205  0.05534  0.03766 
  (0.05989) (0.05924) (0.06116) 
Living in Addis   -0.13219  -0.13888  -0.13101 
  (0.05619)* (0.05967)* (0.06113)* 
Mean value of household assets per hh member (I)  -0.00006    -0.00006 
 (0.00002)**    (0.00003)* 
Total consumption per capita per month (I)    -0.00114  -0.00014 
   (0.00056)*  (0.00073) 
Observations  472 472 472 
     
Standard errors in parentheses       
+ significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% 
(I)= Instrumented by monthly wage income of the parents in the household; gender, age, education, 
marital status, ethnicity, religion, and profession of the household head; and place of living 
 
But the results do not neccessarly imply that urban unemployment is caused by urban 
poverty?  Since unemployment is concentrated among the young the negative 
association between household welfare and unemployment may be a consequence of 
the household’s life cycle.  Households with unemployed youngsters may be in the 
poorest phase of their life time.  To test whether this is the case, we plot household 
welfare measured by consumption per capita, against the age of the household head.  
As we can see in Figure 2, we obtain a horizontal line, indicating that there is little 
variation in consumption per head over the household’s life cycle.  We get the same 
result when we plot assets per household member against the age of the household    16 
 
head.
27   Variation over the household life cycle therefore offers no good explanation 
for the negative association between househgold welfare and unemployment.  
 









































Another explanation for the negative association may come from the strong evidence 
for endogeneity of household welfare.  This indicates that causality may run in the 
opposite direction and reflects a coping mechanism.  When insurance against 
unemployment is lacking, households reduce their consumption or sell their assets to 
cope with the unemployment of one of their members.   
 
Of course our sample consists of urban households.  To check the robustness of our 
finding, we compare with the results from a larger and more representative sample, 
using the national Household Income and Consumption Expenditure (HICE) 1996 data 
provides supporting evidence.  When we restrict ourselves to the urban unemployed, 
we find indeed that they come from households with levels of consumption below those 
of households where the employed come from.  The graph in Figure 3 plots real 
                                                 
27 We also get the same results when we replace the age of the household head by the number of young 
people in the household.    17 
 
household per capita expenditure on the X-axis, and the head count index on the Y-
axis.
28   
 
Figure 3: Poverty incidence amongst urban working and unemployed young men using HICE 1996 data 






































































































For all levels of income, the head count index for the employed is lower than for 
unemployed young men.  This first-order dominance confirms the robsutnes of our  
finding.
29   
However, when we draw the same graph for the entire country, including rural areas, 
we find that the unemployed come from better off households than the employed, 
except at the bottom end of the distribution, as can be seen in Figure 4. 
                                                 
28 The head count index reflects the percentage of people below a poverty line.  A nutrition based poverty 
line, based on a national diet that allows each household member to reach 2200 KCal (adapting for adult 
equivalent units), and marked up with a budget for non-food that should be drawn at 231 PPP USD per 
year. [see Dercon (1997)] 
29 More accurately, it shows that wherever we draw the poverty line, the unemployed young men come 
from households with lower levels of consumption than the employed.    18 
 
 
Figure 4: Poverty incidence amongst all (urban and rural) working and unemployed young men using 
HICE 1996 data 







































































































Thus, relatively speaking, the unemployed do not come from the poorest households.  
Since household welfare does not have a positive effect on unemployment, they also do 
not come from the richest households.  This confirms that unemployment is a ‘middle 
class phenomenon’, as suggested by Myrdal (1968).  The observation that the 
unemployed are reasonably well educated also supports that.   
 
The fact that we find a significant negative relationship for the urban sample is thus 
best explained as a coping mechanism to deal with unemployment.  To maximize 
expected future earnings, middle class families support their sons in queuing for a 
public sector job.  Because the queuing takes so long, this is a drain on household 
resources.  Lowering consumption or selling assets is the household’s coping 
mechanism.   
 
    19 
 
3.4.  The role of job aspirations 
 
An important question is the effect of job aspirations on unemployment.
30  The results 
are presented in Table 8.  We find that aspiring to a public sector job has a large 
significant positive effect, while aspiring to self employment or casual work has a large 
significant negative effect on the probability of becoming unemployed.  This underlines 
the importance of job aspirations and suggests that those who are queuing for a public 
sector job - about half the number of young unemployed – would be more likely to find 
a job if they changed their preferences.  
 
Table 8: The effect of job aspirations 
   (1)  (2)  (3) 
  unemployed unemployed  unemployed 
Aspire to a public sector job  0.15945     
 (0.06317)*     
Aspire to a private sector wage job    0.07138   
   (0.08158)   
Aspire to self employment or casual work       -0.34266 
     (0.06536)** 
Observations 466  466  466 
Standard errors in parentheses; + significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% 
The model controls for age, age squared, level of education, ethnicity, log of body mass index, years of 
schooling of the mother, professional activity of the father, location and household welfare (I). 
(I)= Instrumented by monthly wage income of the parents in the household; gender, age, education, 
marital status, ethnicity, religion and profession of the household head; and place of living 
 
 
3.5.  The importance of the job search medium 
 
Table 9 shows that those searching for a job through the most anonymous media - 
government agencies and advertising - face a higher probability of becoming 
unemployed;  while those asking the employer directly are less likely to be 
unemployed.  The results of a qualitative pilot survey indicate that many youngsters are 
                                                 
30 Since we do not have information on past aspirations of those in work, we assume that the working end 
up in the job they want. The variable thus reflects the actual job for those working, while it reflects the 
aspired job for the unemployed.      20 
 
too shy to ask an employer directly.  This suggests that directly asking the employer 
signals assertive behaviour, and pays off.  Job searching through social networks, 
relatives, friends, or ethnic and religious associations is, however, not rewarding.     
These results remain the same when we control for the type of job.   They contrast with 
the finding that social capital - especially friends and relatives - is important for job 
search in industrialised countries [Holzer (1988), Granovetter (1994)].  However, we 
will see in Section 4.  that those looking for work through their social capital have 
shorter durations of unemployment, suggesting that job search through social capital 
only works once someone is unemployed.    
 
Table 9: The importance of the search medium 
  (1)  (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 unemployed  unemployed  unemployed  unemployed  unemployed 
Job search through relatives and friends  -0.01644         
  (0.05756)      
Job search through government agency    0.22387       
    (0.07764)**     
Job search by asking prospective employer      -0.34342     
     (0.06658)**     
Job search through consulting advertisements      0.17101  
       (0.06003)**   
Job search through ethnic or church association          -0.14656 
         (0.15786) 
Observations  472  472 472 472 472 
Standard errors in parentheses ; + significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% 
The model controls for  age, age squared, level of education, ethnicity, log of body mass index, years of schooling mother, 
professional activity father, location, household welfare (I) 
(I)= Instrumented by monthly wage income of the parents in the household; gender, age, education, marital status, ethnicity, 




4.  The Duration of Unemployment  
 
We know of only four papers that analyse the duration of unemployment in developing 
countries.   Dickens and Lang (1996) find that unemployment duration in Sri Lanka is 4 
years or more, but do not analyse its determinants because they only have data on 
uncompleted spells.  Nevertheless, they show that duration is not related to education in 
Sri Lanka.  Kingdon and Knight (2001) find that about a third of the unemployed in    21 
 
South Africa have a duration of one year or less, while 37% having a duration of more 
than 3 years.  Two other papers exclude first time job seekers, so their results are not 
strictly comparable with ours.  Tunali and Assaad (1992) consider unemployment 
among casual contract workers in the construction sector.  They show that the average 
construction worker frequently experiences unemployment spells and is unemployed 
36% of the time.  The spells last on average 23 days and there are significant 
differences between skill and trade classifications, but education and experience have 
no effect. 
31  Appleton, Knight, Song and Xia (2001) study unemployment duration 
among retrenched workers in China and find an expected duration of 47 months.  Time 
spent in unemployment is longer for the unhealthy and less educated.   
We find that for young men in urban Ethiopia, allowing for right censoring, the 
expected duration is 45 months or almost 4 years, while the median is 35 months or 
close to 3 years.  Figure 5  shows that the distribution of the non-zero duration spells is 
skewed to the right: spells below 2 years represent almost 40%. 
 


















                                                 
31 They consider unemployment ‘due to lack of acceptable employment’ - which is further undefined.  
Using data that is collected during the recession of the late eighties, they find that the average worker is 
thirty-six percent of the time involuntarily unemployed.  They do not control for unobserved 
heterogeneity, which usually affects the results [see Nickel (1979), Lancaster (1990), Kiefer (1988) and 
van den Berg (2000)]  but they do test for alternative specifications of the hazard, and find that their 
results are robust.    22 
 
We analyse unemployment duration by investigating the determinants of the hazard 
rate, which is the probability of leaving unemployment conditional on having been in 
unemployment so far. 
32  To interpret the determinants of the hazard rate, one uses a 
proportional hazard (PH) model.  The strong assumption underlying this type of model 
is that the explanatory variables have the same proportional effect on all points of the 
hazard.  For example, having completed senior secondary school would have the same 
effect on the hazard after one year as it would have after four years of unemployment.   
The hazard can be written as a product of two components: one depending on t alone - 
the baseline hazard - and one depending on the explanatory variables alone.  The 
proportionality assumption means that the two components enter the hazard function 
multiplicative.  This cannot readily be justified on economic-theoretical grounds.   Only 
if the optimal strategy of the individual is myopic, proportionality can be deduced from 
theory, as is shown by van den Berg (2000).  The most obvious case for this is when 
discount rates are high, but the opportunity to engage in ‘repeated search’ may also play 
a role.  When agents know they have a second chance, they will be more likely to 
behave myopically.  We know that the unemployed come from households with low 
levels of welfare, hence the unemployed will have relatively high discount rates.  It is 
also known that young people often use high discount rates and behave myopically 
(O’Donoghue and Rabin 2000).   There is also evidence for repeated (on-the-) job 
search in Ethiopia.  Mengistae (1999) finds that people in the private sector queue for a 
public sector job.  These arguments provide a conceptual basis for proportionality, but 
whether it holds in practice is an empirical question; which we address formally in the 
next section.  
 
                                                 
32 We model the hazard rate rather than duration since we are interested in the transition from one state 
to another, which reflects an individual’s career path.  From a methodological point of view, it is of 
course equivalent to model duration or hazard. Assuming a particular distribution of the duration spells is 
equivalent to pinning down a course for the hazard rate.      23 
 
4.1.  Testing proportionality 
 
The Cox model allows us to test the proportionality assumption.  
33  We find that it is 
rejected at the 0.03 level 
34, implying that we should be cautious with interpreting the 
coefficients in the usual way.  Interestingly enough, the point estimates obtained by the 
Cox-model do not vary significantly from the estimates obtained from other models.
 35   
We conclude that the coefficients are robust to different specifications. However, 
because the data fails proportionality, we proceed with an alternative model, namely the 
piece-wise constant hazard model, which does not require this assumption.   
 
Note that in all our models, we control for unobserved heterogeneity.  This is important 
because especially in duration analysis, the results are sensitive to unobserved 
heterogeneity (van den Berg 2000).   We control for it in a parametric rather than a non-
parametric way (using a mixture model), for three reasons. First, we find that all our 
estimates remain the same assuming alternative distributions for unobserved 
heterogeneity. Second, there is evidence that the main cause of bias in the results of 
mixture models is misspecification of the baseline hazard rather than assuming the 
wrong distribution of heterogeneity (Ridder and Verbakel 1983). Third, the method to 
estimate mixture models is complex and its calculations are long and error prone 
(Lancaster 1990).  Because it has not been applied frequently, little is known about the 
properties of its estimator.   
                                                 
33  The actual test is based on the findings by Grambsch and Therneau (1994) that the Schoenfeld 
residuals should have a slope of zero for each covariate.  So the test looks at whether the covariance 
between the residual and the time-dependent regressor is large. The residuals can be interpreted as the 
nonparametric estimate of the log hazard ratio function.  The basic mechanics of the test are explained in 
Lancaster (1990) p323.  
34 The test allows for different uses of time. The lowest p-value is p=0.03.  
35  Table 15 in appendix reports the estimates from the Cox and PH models.     24 
 
4.2.  Piece-wise constant hazard estimation allowing the coefficients to vary  
 
The piece-wise constant hazard model considers a constant hazard but allows the 
hazard to shift over time by introducing dummy variables for different time 
segments.  We interact these dummies with the independent variables, thus allowing 
the variables to have different effects over the defined intervals.  The interpretation 
is similar to an OLS regression with time-specific slopes.  We define two intervals: 
below 6 years and beyond 6 years. This choice is based on the course of the hazard 
rate. We find that a Weibull model fits the data well and that the hazard follows an 
inverse U–shape which reaches a maximum around 6 years.
36 The results are 
presented in column one in Table 10.   The coefficients reflect the change in the log 
of the hazard due to a one-unit change in the variable concerned.  Column two takes 
the same approach but slices the first 72 months further down into 3 segments of 24 
months.  This is of interest because 78% of the unemployed spend less than 72 
months in unemployment.   
 
Table 10: Piecewise constant hazard with varying coefficients  
    
  Hazard rate  Hazard rate 
  2 segments of 72 months  4 segments of 24 months 
    
Age -1.37088  -1.57839 
 (0.39282)**  (0.44980)** 
Age x d2  2.68488  0.90621 
 (1.69373)  (1.11407) 
Age x d3    0.57413 
   (2.07545) 
Age x d4    2.84944 
   (1.71195)+ 
Age  squared  0.02758  0.03243 
 (0.00805)**  (0.00927)** 
Ages x d2  -0.06760  -0.01851 
 (0.03439)*  (0.02284) 
Ages x d3    -0.01553 
   (0.04106) 
Ages x d4    -0.07170 
   (0.03482)* 
Primary is highest level of education  0.14469  -0.46165 
 (0.44069)  (0.58441) 
Primary x d2  -1.46836  1.20101 
 (1.26601)  (1.10176) 
Primary x d3    2.25403 
   (1.48622) 
                                                 
36 A more detailed discussion of the course of the hazard rate can be found in Serneels (2002a).    25 
 
Primary x d4    -0.81354 
   (1.33476) 
Junior secondary is highest level of education  0.25512  -0.07296 
 (0.45323)  (0.57444) 
Junior secondary x d2  -25.44132  0.96967 
 (1.27366)**  (1.09450) 
Junior secondary x d3    1.53246 
   (1.76979) 
Junior secondary x d4    -30.02288 
   (1.31187)** 
Senior secondary is highest level of education  0.43233  0.04726 
 (0.43104)  (0.55814) 
Senior secondary x d2  2.71421  0.97185 
 (1.48720)+  (1.02565) 
Senior secondary x d3    1.97731 
   (1.62794) 
Senior secondary x d4    3.17294 
   (1.53706)* 
Tertiar is highest level of education   0.27157  0.37541 
 (0.71529)  (0.73107) 
Oromo 0.50287  0.52309 
 (0.28116)+  (0.28003)+ 
Gurage -0.03267  -0.00969 
 (0.32828)  (0.32188) 
Tigray 0.10733  -0.04205 
 (0.45501)  (0.45313) 
Body Mass Index  0.01008  0.01148 
 (0.01415)  (0.01339) 
Years of schooling mother   0.04379  0.02549 
 (0.03672)  (0.04982) 
Years of schooling mother x d2  -0.35669  -0.03476 
 (0.12322)**  (0.09262) 
Years of schooling mother x d3    0.17468 
   (0.08419)* 
Years of schooling mother x d4    -0.33032 
   (0.12523)** 
Father works in civil service   0.02284  0.20272 
 (0.28594)  (0.36460) 
Father civil servant x d2  1.60540  -1.54770 
 (0.59039)**  (1.08918) 
Father civil servant x d3    0.25478 
   (0.76040) 
Father civil servant x d4    1.42083 
   (0.64414)* 
Father works as self-employed  0.01326  -0.08324 
 (0.29610)  (0.40215) 
Father self-employed x d2  1.68505  0.04643 
 (0.66259)*  (0.64635) 
Father self-employed x d3    0.45642 
   (0.75201) 
Father self-employed x d4    1.77032 
   (0.72533)* 
Father is unemployed  -27.77527  -32.89287 
 (0.48808)**  (0.57340)** 
Father unemployed x d2  1.23463  -0.11258 
 (1.15857)  (0.84359) 
Father unemployed x d3    -0.54899 
   (1.24116) 
Father unemployed x d4    1.02679 
   (1.31230) 
Living in Addis Ababa  0.04330  0.07119 
 (0.25122)  (0.25033) 
Local unemployment rate   -4.41350  -4.64509 
 (2.21440)*  (2.26782)* 
Constant 12.26913  14.79692 
 (4.58157)**  (5.07136)** 
d2 -24.74370  -11.72198 
 (20.53043)  (12.94179) 
d3   -6.57162 
   (25.03750) 
d4   -26.71165 
   (20.71419) 
Ln_the:Constant #  -13.12033  -16.27127 
 (1.11696)**  (1.26981)** 
Number of observation s  393  393 
Standard errors in parentheses; + significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% 
# is the parameter that indicates  heterogeneity    26 
 
4.3.  Individual characteristics 
  
Age has a strong negative influence on the hazard rate, even after controlling for the 
individual’s highest level of education.  The older one gets, the lower the probability of 
leaving unemployment if one has not already done so.  The age effect is convex and 
becomes less negative over time.  A young man aged 18 is 4 times less likely than an 
otherwise identical young man of 15 to leave unemployment, while a 22 year old is at 
least 12 times less likely to leave unemployment than the 15 year old.  This effect has 
the same sign but is considerably larger than in OECD countries. It suggests that if 
employers are using unemployment duration as a screening device, as suggested by 
Blanchard and Diamond (1994), they use it in combination with age. 
 
Different levels of education have different effects on the hazard. Primary education 
has no effect - this is what we expect given the relatively high levels of education in 
urban Ethiopia.
37  In contrast, secondary education does have strong effects, but only 
for long durations.  Those with junior secondary schooling are (dramatically) less likely 
to leave unemployment in the long run, whereas senior secondary school educated are 
more likely to leave unemployment in the long run. Given the limited number of those 
who are tertiary educated, we cannot draw any inference on its effects.  Figure 6 
visualises the education effects.   For the majority of unemployed (those with durations 
below seventy-two months), education has limited effects on the hazard.  In the long 
run however, higher levels of education only have a positive effect for senior secondary 
education.  Thus junior secondary education combined with long duration is interpreted 
                                                 
37 The gross primary school enrolment rate for boys in urban areas was 98.2 in 1996  [Dercon (1999)].      27 
 
as a signal of low ability.  Note also that those who are junior secondary educated do 
not have higher chances in the job market than those who are primary educated. 
38 
 




































Ethnicity has a significant effect in the sense that the Oromo are slightly more likely to 
leave unemployment.  This may indicate an overhaul of the government policy in the 
early years when the Tigray were said to be favoured.  Further supporting evidence for 
this interpretation is that when we only consider unemployment spells that started 
before the political change, being Oromo has no effect (results not reported).    
 
We find no evidence for an effect of health, as measured by body mass index, on the 
hazard, which supports the conclusion from the incidence analysis, that nutrition health 




                                                 
38 We make an abstraction from the effect education has on the kind of job and the wage one gets. (For 
the latter see for example Krishnan (1996).    28 
 
4.4.  Household background 
 
Mother’s education has a negative effect on the hazard in the long run, which may 
reflect an indirect effect of mother’s education on job preferences and reservation 
wages.   The father’s profession plays an important role, but only in the long run: the 
long term unemployed with a father working as a civil servant or as a self-employed are 
more likely to leave unemployment.  The father’s employment status on the other hand, 
has an immediate effect: those with a father in unemployment are significantly less 
likely to leave unemployment in the first few years.  As we will see, these variables 
remain significant when we include household welfare, indicating that the negative 
effect from having an unemployed father is more than just a welfare effect.  It may be 
that young men with an unemployed father are discouraged from looking for work, or 
that it is related to other unobservable characteristics.    
The high significance of father’s profession reveals something about the job searching 
process.  Public service vacancies in Ethiopia are advertised by the Federal Public 
Service Commission following strict procedures.  From anecdotal evidence, we know 
that the hiring procedure for civil servants takes several months.  It is unlikely that 
fathers have a direct influence on their sons’ hiring because the procedures are so strict.  
However, in this bureaucratic environment, having inside information is vital and 
having a father working as a civil servant creates an information advantage.   Self-
employed fathers can of course recruit their own son, or they may provide information 
on how to set up their own business.      
Another interpretation of the importance of the father’s profession is that it affects the 
son’s preferences.  Young men with a father working as a civil servant may be more 
likely to aspire to a civil service job; likewise for the self-employed.     
    29 
 
Interestingly enough, duration spells in Addis are not significantly longer or shorter 
than in the other big cities.  To better capture the effect of the local labour market, we 
construct a local unemployment rate.   Evidence from the US and the UK shows that 
unemployment is often concentrated in certain regions.  Kingdon and Knight (1999) 
confirm this for South Africa and show that unemployment is concentrated in the home 
lands.  Since we are especially interested in how the state of the local labour market 
affects the hazard, we develop a local unemployment rate for each town and for six 
separate identified neighbourhoods in Addis Ababa. 
39  We find that the local 
unemployment rate has a large negative and significant effect on the hazard.  This 
effect weakens, but still remains significant when we control for household welfare.  
Locality thus plays an important role.  It also suggests that immobility, possibly driven 
by home ownership, contributes to unemployment in an important way.
40   
 
 
4.5.  The importance of the constant  
 
One of the most important results of our analysis is the high significance of the 
constant, which suggests that the hazard rate does not change over time and that there is 
limited duration dependence. 
41  
 
                                                 
39 Each town in Ethiopia is divided in weredas, which is again divided into kebeles, the smallest urban 
dwelling unit.  Using this detailed data, we identify six different parts of Addis Ababa that can be 
considered as geographical units of economic activity.  Given their limited size, the other towns are 
considered as one unit.  
40 Muellbauer (1994) and Oswald (1996) find that immobility due to home ownership is an important 
factor in the United Kingdom.  
41 The reasons for this are investigated in Serneels (2002a).    30 
 
4.6.  The role of job aspirations  
 
Job aspirations have a strong effect on the hazard, as shown in Table 11.  Those 
aspiring to a public sector job are less likely to leave unemployment, while those going 
for self employment or casual work are more likely to leave unemployment.  Since the 
public sector is associated with relatively high wages, while self employment and 
casual work are associated with low wages, this indicates that the unemployed are 
queuing for a high paid job.  
 
 
Table 11: The effect of job aspirations on the hazard 
 (1)  (2)  (3) 
  Hazard rate  Hazard rate  Hazard rate 
Aspiring  to public sector   -0.49378     
 (0.25252)+     
Aspiring to formal private sector    0.31814   
   (0.28838)   
Aspiring to self employment or casual work       1.03405 
     (0.25048)** 
Robust standard errors in parentheses, + significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% 
The model controls for age, age squared, level of education, ethnicity, body mass index, mother’s education, father’s professional 
activity, place of living, local unemployment rate, constant, a dummy taking the value one for spells longer than seventy-two 
months, and an interaction term of  this dummy with age, age squared, education level, mother’s education, father’s professional 




When we introduce job preferences, this does not weaken the effect of junior secondary 
education (results not reported).  The long term unemployed who enjoyed junior 
secondary education still have a lower hazard than the primary educated, suggesting 
that, even though junior secondary education may affect job preferences, it also has a 
direct effect and does not increase one’s chances in the labour market. This supports 
results from Krishnan (1996) who finds that returns to junior secondary education are 
negligible. 
    31 
 
4.7.  The importance of social networks  
 
Table 12 confirms earlier findings that the medium through which job searching takes 
place is important.  Those who look for a job through friends and relatives have shorter 
durations.  Combined with the lack of effect of social networks on the incidence of 
unemployment, this suggests that social networks only pay off once the individual 
actually is unemployed, rendering support to the interpretation of social capital as an 
insurance mechanism: it gets into operation after the individual has been exposed to the 
risk.    It suggests that friends and relatives only report vacancies to the actual 
unemployed. They may do this because the actual unemployed have a higher marginal 
utility of getting a job.  A notion of fairness may also play a role, where people prefer 
to provide job information to unemployed for a job rather than working friends looking 
for a better job.    As in the analysis on the incidence of unemployment, those who 
search by asking the prospective employer directly also have shorter durations.  
 
 
Table 12: The role of the medium of job search  
  (1)  (2) (3)  (4) (5) 
  Hazard rate  Hazard rate  Hazard rate  Hazard rate  Hazard rate 
Job search through relatives & friends  0.66841         
  (0.23727)**       
Job search through government agency    0.11169       
   (0.32176)       
Job search through church/ethnic association      0.55161     
     (0.67840)     
Job search through advertisement         0.08135   
       (0.23226)   
Job search by asking employer directly           1.03565 
         (0.28954)** 
Robust standard errors in parentheses, + significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% 
The model controls for age, age squared, level of education, ethnicity, body mass index, mother’s education, father’s professional 
activity, place of living, local unemployment rate, constant, a dummy taking the value one for spells longer than seventy-two 
months, and an interaction term of  this dummy with age, age squared, education level, mother’s education, father’s professional 
activity, and the constant.   The model controls for unobserved heterogeneity, which is assumed to follow an inverse Gaussian 
distribution 
    32 
 
 
4.8.  The role of household welfare and other issues 
 
Table 13 includes household welfare in the model.  We find that it is negatively 
correlated with the hazard.  Those coming from richer households leave unemployment 
earlier however we measure household welfare - as the value of assets per capita or as 
household consumption per capita. Unemployment duration is thus shorter for those 
coming from better off households.  This is consistent with what we found for the 
incidence analysis. 
 
Table 13: The role of household welfare  
 (1)  (2)  (3) 
  Hazard rate  Hazard rate  Hazard rate 
Value of assets per household member   0.00004    0.00006 
 (0.00001)**    (0.00005) 
Consumption per capita     0.00212  0.00191 
   (0.00040)**  (0.00041)** 
Robust standard errors in parentheses, + significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% 
The model controls for age, age squared, level of education, ethnicity, body mass index, mother’s education, father’s professional 
activity, place of living, local unemployment rate, constant, a dummy taking the value one for spells longer than seventy-two 
months, and an interaction term of  this dummy with age, age squared, education level, mother’s education, father’s professional 
activity, and the constant.   The model controls for unobserved heterogeneity, which is assumed to follow an inverse Gaussian 
distribution 
 
A formal test for endogeneity in duration models is cumbersome to construct.
42  To see 
whether the results in Table 13 are biased by potential endogeneity of household 
welfare, we test whether the coefficients are different when we include its predicted 
value from an auxiliary equation.  We find that none of the coefficients change 
significantly whether we use assets or consumption, as can be seen in Table 16 and 
Table 17 in appendix 7.6.   This suggests that even if the variable is endogenous, it does 
not bias our results.
43  
 
                                                 
42 The most straightforward way is to follow the general methodology for correcting standard errors in 
two step models, as set out by Murphy and Topel (1985), or McKenzie and McAleer (1990) and applied 
to duration models by Tunali and Assaad (1992).  But if standard deviations are high, it may be more 
appropriate to estimate the model by full maximum likelihood.  
43 Comparison with the results without household welfare also shows that our results are robust.      33 
 
Again we cannot draw any conclusions on the causality of the relationship between 
unemployment duration and household welfare, and the relationship may suggest the 
existence of coping mechanisms where households with unemployed lower their levels 
of consumption and sell their assets.  
 
We found earlier that having a mother who is self-employed has a significant negative 
effect during the first six years (results not reported), suggesting that the long term 
unemployed are more likely to have a mother who is self-employed. It is not clear what 
the direction of causation is.  However, since the effect remains significant, even after 
we control for household welfare, it is likely to run in the other direction, suggesting 
that mothers supply additional labour when their son has been unemployed for a while.  
A formal investigation whether there is indeed this type of added worker effect from 
mothers as a response to the unemployment of their sons is carried out ina sperate 
paper.   
Finally, we find that household composition
44 or size has no significant relationship 
with the hazard, nor does the migration status of the household.  Being married is 
positively and significantly related with the hazard, but direction of causation may well 
be the other way round.   
 
4.9.  Changes in the political and economic environment  
 
In all our models, unobserved heterogeneity is significant and large. Given that we are 
using cross sectional single spell data, an important candidate for heterogeneity is the 
timing of the unemployment spell.  Ethiopia underwent substantial changes in the 
                                                 
44 Neither the number of other unemployed in the household, nor the number of dependants (children and 
elderly) in the household has a significant effect.    34 
 
socio-economic environment during the years before the survey.  In 1991, the job 
guarantee for the tertiary educated was also abolished.  Until then, university graduates 
had been assured of a job as civil servant. We investigate whether these changes have 
affected the duration of unemployment.  When we include a dummy variable to 
indicate that the unemployment spell started in or after 1991, it has a small coefficient 
which has very low significance. 
45   The abolishment of the job guarantee for the 
tertiary educated has had no effect on the duration of unemployment, presumably 
because the number of tertiary educated is very small.   
 
5.  Summary and Conclusion  
 
We find that the nature of unemployment in urban Ethiopia is not unlike that observed 
in Sri Lanka, Indonesia, Malaysia, Tunisia and Colombia
46: it is concentrated among 
relatively well educated first time job seekers who aspire to a well paid job, especially a 
public sector job.  The vast majority of unemployed have never refused a job and are 
supported by their parents.  Mean duration of unemployment is around 4 years, which 
is similar to what Dickens and Lang  (1996) observe for Sri Lanka.  
 
When we compare the determinants of incidence and duration of unemployment, we 
find that they have very similar determinants, reflecting that unemployment is a 
queuing process.
47  There are two important qualifications:  (1) Whereas junior 
secondary education has a positive effect on the duration (or a negative effect on the 
hazard) in the long term, senior secondary education has a negative effect on duration 
                                                 
45 The results remain are the same when we try 1989, 1990 and 1992 as the dates for a structural 
break.  
46 see Glewwe (1989), Dickens and Lang (1996), Manning and Junankar (1998), Rama (1998, 1999), 
Tenjo (1990) 
47 In contrast to the analysis before, here we focus on duration rather than on the hazard rate,. Since we 
use a piecewise constant hazard, the effect of duration is the negative of the effect on the hazard.  Table 
18 in appendix gives an overview.   
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in the long term; and (2) job search through friends and religious and ethnic 
associations has no effect on the incidence but a negative effect on duration, suggesting 
that social capital is important for job searching, as suggested by Holzer (1988) and 
Granovetter (1992), but only starts working once the individual is unemployed.   
 
Combining the results, we conclude that unemployment in Ethiopia is consistent with 
unemployment in a segmented labour market.
48  Public sector and formal private sector 
employment are considered ‘good jobs’ because they pay well, while self employment, 
casual and co-operative employment are bad jobs because they pay badly.   Civil 
service is the dominant good job and requires some level of education; self employment 
and casual work are the dominant the dominant ‘bad jobs’.  The former pays two and a 
half times the earnings of the latter.    This provides an incentive for the middle classes 
to get education and queue in unemployment for a good job, especially a public sector 
job, while foregoing earnings as self-employed. However, a number of those who 
aspire to a public sector will never get one.  At the same time, a minority of young men 
would like to start their own business but is constrained to do so, indicating that credit 
constraints are another cause of unemployment.  We find suggestive evidence that 
households reduce their savings and consumption to cope with unemployment, 
although further research is needed to establish this.    
 
A crucial assumption in a segmented labour market model is that mobility between the 
sectors is limited.  Using data from the most recent round of the panel survey, we find 
                                                 
48 A convincing formal test for labour market sefmentation is not available since sector allocation may 
always be driven by unobserved characetristics, as argued by Heckman and Hotz (1986), Heckman and 
Sedlacek (1985) and Magnac (1991).  Nevertheless, most economists agree that segmented labour market 
theory has something to offer and that the evidence is too strong to neglect the theory altogether.  (See 
Katz and Summers (1989), Saint-Paul (1996), Stiglitz (1982), Lang and Dickens (1992), McCormick 
(1990).  McDonald and Solow (1985) and Bulow and Summers (1986). ) 
Our view is that, although we can not test segmentation of the labour market formally for the moment, it 
is worth exploring it further.  This is also the approach followed by Saint-Paul (1996), who provides the 
most important contribu    36 
 
support for this assumption.  Comparing the occupations over a 6 year period, we find 
that 84% of those working in a good job remain in it, while 82% of those working in a 
bad job remain in it.
49   An intriguing question is why young men do not take up a 
casual job while they are waiting in unemployment for a public sector job?   We see 4 
reasons.  First, they do not have the funds to start their own business.  This is confirmed 
by the answer to a question included in the most recent round of the survey.  86% the 
unemployed who aspire to a public sector say they do not become self-employed 
because they do not have the start-up capital.  Second, social networks are the most 
important channel through which a job is found, but it only works once one actually is 
unemployed.  Young men are thus implicitly encouraged to be unemployed rather than 
take up a temporary job.  Third, school results play a role in the public sector screening 
process. Current practice is that people can resit secondary school exams to improve 
their results.  Annecdotal evidence suggests that some young men resit their exams to 
get higher marks and improve their chances to be accepted for a public sector job, 
although this does not seem to happen on a large scale.  A fourth reason is that social 
status is important.  Bad jobs are associated with low social status.  If individuals have 
a reservation level for social status that is above the level associated with bad jobs, they 
will not accept a bad job.  The reservation level of social status may be explained by 
social custom.  In a stratified society, each caste has its norms and deviation of the 
norm may imply a loss of reputation, as suggested by Akerlof (1976, 1980).  Glewwe 
(1989) suggests that the lack of social status of bad jobs in Sri Lanka stops young 
unemployed men taking up a bad job and a pilot survey of qualitative interviews with 
unemployed men suggests that this is also the case in urban Ethiopia.  
50  
                                                 
49 Public sector, international organization and private sector wage work are considered good jobs, while 
self employment, casual work and co-operative work are considered bad jobs. 
50 A fifth potential reason would be that people are waiting for a response from their potential employer.  
But the new round of the survey shows that this is not a valid explanation: seventy-two percent of public    37 
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7.  Appendix 
 
 
7.1.  Results of the first stage regression on assets and comnsumption 
 
 
Table 0-14: First stage regression of household welfare on selected instruments. 
 (1)  (2) 




Main income parents  0.06221  0.00346 
 (0.02722)*  (0.00063)** 
Household head is male  516.71500  2.88756 
 (266.84422)+  (16.04889) 
Age of household head  -38.34316  0.25102 
 (88.75848)  (4.05786) 
Age of household head squared  0.90126  -0.00686 
 (1.01621)  (0.03835) 
Years of schooling household head  232.62307  6.50945 
 (37.70748)**  (1.52648)** 
Household head is married  -744.84298  -20.94064 
 (318.46585)*  (12.13153)+ 
Household head is self employed  967.00838  2.85274 
 (301.98352)**  (14.52834) 
Household head is unemployed  -52.62959  -26.35957 
 (249.42880)  (15.25417)+ 
Household head is Gurage  -1,045.07764  -35.62182 
 (314.54595)**  (11.15907)** 
Household head is Amhara  -238.53593  2.10156 
 (324.42249)  (9.15560) 
Household head is muslim  130.25600  -3.00365 
 (393.28807)  (14.47242) 
living in Awassa  -1,488.65331  -10.10525 
 (413.79930)**  (25.77828) 
living in Dessie  117.08524  68.55341 
 (957.62667)  (94.66447) 
living in Diredawa  653.05194  38.84904 
 (472.29775)  (24.31270) 
Constant -251.50870  93.01681 
 (1,849.85876)  (109.43818) 
Observations 472  472 
R-squared 0.20  0.15 
Robust standard errors in parentheses     
+ significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% 
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7.2. Comparing Estimates for Different Proportional Hazard Models  
 
Table 15: Estimates for proportional hazard models assuming Inverse Gaussian heterogeneity, in 
accelerated failure time format   
  Parametric Semi-
parametric
51 
 Exponential  Weibull  Gompertz  Cox 
Age -1.29443  -1.64888  -1.32041  -1.33917 
 (0.38409)**  (1.44713)  (0.38868)**  (0.39153)** 
Age squared  0.02517  0.03222  0.02544  0.02600 
 (0.00789)**  (0.03064)  (0.00795)**  (0.00797)** 
Primary is highest level of education  0.13420  0.16182  0.14696  0.12848 
 (0.44126)  (0.56789)  (0.44621)  (0.43542) 
Junior secondary is highest level of education  0.34675  0.41437  0.41735  0.40323 
 (0.44761)  (0.70424)  (0.47844)  (0.47101) 
Senior secondary is highest level   0.77623  0.90311  0.86739  0.81503 
 (0.41831)+  (0.57498)  (0.46918)+  (0.45877)+ 
Tertiar is highest level of education   0.57015  0.75180  0.61651  0.59897 
 (0.68039)  (0.86843)  (0.69628)  (0.68131) 
Oromo 0.54507  0.74175  0.54648  0.53541 
 (0.27483)*  (1.19506)  (0.27774)*  (0.27261)* 
Gurage 0.07403  0.03656  0.06969  0.08722 
 (0.32101)  (0.51280)  (0.32185)  (0.31793) 
Tigray 0.10597  0.03851  0.12910  0.10554 
 (0.45709)  (0.85178)  (0.46620)  (0.46612) 
Body Mass Index  0.01137  0.01437  0.01143  0.00987 
 (0.01538)  (0.01853)  (0.01587)  (0.01558) 
Father works in civil service 0.13701  0.07202  0.13784  0.10537 
 (0.27399)  (0.45380)  (0.27637)  (0.27210) 
Father works as self-employed 0.10289  0.06960  0.10215  0.08068 
 (0.27719)  (0.37411)  (0.27978)  (0.27564) 
Father is unemployed   -27.45593  -20.22955  -28.19139  -45.00663 
 (0.48185)**  (1.55033)**  (0.48464)**  (0.00000) 
Years of schooling mother   0.03098  0.03474  0.03235  0.02973 
 (0.03633)  (0.04441)  (0.03667)  (0.03616) 
Living in Addis Ababa  0.01738  0.00146  0.02612  0.03328 
 (0.24381)  (0.34820)  (0.24735)  (0.24576) 
Local unemployment rate  -3.76277  -4.53599  -3.73252  -3.60136 
 (2.09617)+  (4.08630)  (2.11512)+  (2.11616)+ 
Constant 11.40834  14.95354  11.70810   
 (4.48253)*  (15.90315)  (4.53724)**   
Ln_the :Constant  -13.40315  0.51968  -13.08669   
 (1.62693)**  (8.30268)  (2.55954)**   
Ln_p :Constant    0.25920     
   (0.70599)     
Gamma :Constant      0.00273   
     (0.00434)   
Observations 378  378  378  378 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
+ significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% 
 
 
                                                 
51 Note that the Cox model scores very weakly relative to other models. Using the Akaike Information 
Criterion (AIC), it performs substantially poorer than any of the fully parametric models.  Inspection of 
the goodness of fit for the Cox model can be done by comparing the observed and expected number of 
events for the completed spells, as pointed out by Hosmer and Lemeshow (1999) and developed by 
Coviello (2000).   For the model with all observations, the observed and the expected risk are not 
significantly different in any of the deciles (lowest p-value 0.19), while for the model with completed 
spells only, it is only in the second deciles that the expected is different from the observed risk at the 
p=0.04 level, the lowest p-value for the other quintiles is 0.20.  Unfortunately this evaluation method is 
cumbersome and does not have its ready equivalents for the other models.  Comparison between models 




7.3. The Role of Household Welfare for Duration  
 
Table 16: Comparing the coefficients with household welfare, measured by hh assets, and its predicted 
value 
 (1)  (2)  (3) 
  Hazard rate  Hazard rate  Hazard rate 
Age -1.37088  -1.41538  -1.49916 
 (0.39282)**  (0.37368)**  (0.40121)** 
Age x d2  2.68488  2.96661  3.46441 
 (1.69373)  (1.70827)+  (2.23905) 
Age squared  0.02758  0.02818  0.02999 
 (0.00805)**  (0.00766)**  (0.00821)** 
Age squared x d2  -0.06760  -0.07313  -0.08055 
 (0.03439)*  (0.03473)*  (0.04682)+ 
Primary is highest level of education 0.14469  0.03923  0.48561 
 (0.44069)  (0.47321)  (0.54919) 
Primary x d2  -1.46836  -1.24596  -2.84338 
 (1.26601)  (1.29128)  (1.24080)* 
Junior secondary is highest level of education   0.25512  0.30123  0.24469 
 (0.45323)  (0.46596)  (0.57850) 
Junior secondary x d2  -25.44132  -24.32934  -29.61596 
 (1.27366)**  (1.27650)**  (1.62644)** 
Senior secondary is highest level of education  0.43233  0.41151  0.61776 
 (0.43104)  (0.44538)  (0.56129) 
Senior secondary x d2  2.71421  2.84518  0.07762 
 (1.48720)+  (1.51694)+  (1.49680) 
Tertiary is highest level of education  0.27157  0.19140  -0.44265 
 (0.71529)  (0.73630)  (1.13478) 
Bmi 0.01008  0.00773  0.02478 
 (0.01415)  (0.01622)  (0.00902)** 
Oromo 0.50287  0.58164  0.29694 
 (0.28116)+  (0.27999)*  (0.32580) 
Gurage -0.03267  -0.19579  -0.32177 
 (0.32828)  (0.36617)  (0.34595) 
Tigray 0.10733  0.10409  -0.08226 
 (0.45501)  (0.45736)  (0.43139) 
Father works in civil service  0.02284  -0.03270  0.03953 
 (0.28594)  (0.27981)  (0.31355) 
Father work in civil service x d2  1.60540  1.59268  1.80829 
 (0.59039)**  (0.54733)**  (0.82728)* 
Father works as self-employed  0.01326  0.06902  0.05382 
 (0.29610)  (0.29870)  (0.32176) 
Father works as self-employed x d2  1.68505  1.61260  2.56700 
 (0.66259)*  (0.66888)*  (0.91948)** 
Father is unemployed  -27.77527  -27.30235  -29.34052 
 (0.48808)**  (0.49235)**  (0.56775)** 
Father is unemployed x d2  1.23463  1.17174  0.70664 
 (1.15857)  (1.13054)  (1.29431) 
Years of schooling mother   0.04379  0.04639  0.00241 
 (0.03672)  (0.03628)  (0.03972) 
Years of schooling mother  x d2  -0.35669  -0.35353  -0.52263 
 (0.12322)**  (0.12203)**  (0.21154)* 
Living in Addis  0.04330  0.00822  -0.08649 
 (0.25122)  (0.25375)  (0.27311) 
Local unemployment rate  -4.41350  -3.75352  -5.42215 
 (2.21440)*  (2.24107)+  (2.38001)* 
d2 -24.74370  -28.30091  -34.57985 
 (20.53043)  (20.69958)  (26.03600) 
Ln_the:Constant# -13.12033  -14.96384  -15.62805 
 (1.11696)**  (1.07419)**  (1.02694)** 
Mean value of household assets per household member     0.00004   
   (0.00001)**   
Linear prediction of mean value hh assets per hh member      0.00021 
     (0.00010)* 
Constant 12.26913  12.79526  13.96838 
 (4.58157)**  (4.34115)**  (4.46943)** 
Observations 457  452  315 
Robust standard errors in parentheses       
+ significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%       
# indicates parameter of heterogeneity       
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Table 17: Comparing the coefficients with household welfare, measured by consumption and its 
predicted value 
 (1)  (2)  (3) 
  Hazard rate  Hazard rate  Hazard rate 
Age -1.37088  -1.12293  -1.53205 
 (0.39282)**  (0.42127)**  (0.42115)** 
Age x d2  2.68488  3.37990  3.60582 
 (1.69373)  (1.84829)+  (2.12792)+ 
Age squared  0.02758  0.02205  0.03064 
 (0.00805)**  (0.00862)*  (0.00859)** 
Age squared x d2  -0.06760  -0.08051  -0.08349 
 (0.03439)*  (0.03833)*  (0.04448)+ 
Primary is highest level of education 0.14469  0.00389  0.48959 
 (0.44069)  (0.46866)  (0.54274) 
Primary x d2  -1.46836  -1.79399  -2.80495 
 (1.26601)  (1.32184)  (1.24514)* 
Junior secondary is highest level of education   0.25512  0.29098  0.32690 
 (0.45323)  (0.49121)  (0.56709) 
Junior secondary x d2  -25.44132  -26.37347  -28.47385 
 (1.27366)**  (1.34418)**  (1.61609)** 
Senior secondary is highest level of education  0.43233  0.32074  0.70355 
 (0.43104)  (0.47530)  (0.54652) 
Senior secondary x d2  2.71421  2.29418  0.30076 
 (1.48720)+  (1.55435)  (1.51678) 
Tertiary is highest level of education  0.27157  -0.61339  -0.33735 
 (0.71529)  (0.98707)  (1.13824) 
Bmi 0.01008  0.01247  0.02369 
 (0.01415)  (0.01365)  (0.00853)** 
Oromo 0.50287  0.75375  0.28160 
 (0.28116)+  (0.28448)**  (0.33068) 
Gurage -0.03267  0.13711  -0.19948 
 (0.32828)  (0.34831)  (0.35838) 
Tigray 0.10733  0.31368  -0.10530 
 (0.45501)  (0.46395)  (0.45223) 
Father works in civil service  0.02284  -0.24842  -0.00629 
 (0.28594)  (0.34472)  (0.31943) 
Father work in civil service x d2  1.60540  1.89595  1.85492 
 (0.59039)**  (0.62335)**  (0.83816)* 
Father works as self-employed  0.01326  0.02226  0.06359 
 (0.29610)  (0.30216)  (0.32677) 
Father works as self-employed x d2  1.68505  1.71448  2.45483 
 (0.66259)*  (0.69553)*  (0.92202)** 
Father is unemployed  -27.77527  -27.72934  -28.54538 
 (0.48808)**  (0.48685)**  (0.57302)** 
Father is unemployed x d2  1.23463  1.29679  0.78843 
 (1.15857)  (1.20343)  (1.27140) 
Years of schooling mother   0.04379  0.05091  0.01311 
 (0.03672)  (0.03867)  (0.04052) 
Years of schooling mother  x d2  -0.35669  -0.40060  -0.50418 
 (0.12322)**  (0.13706)**  (0.19638)* 
Living in Addis  0.04330  0.04432  0.03547 
 (0.25122)  (0.26970)  (0.26462) 
Local unemployment rate  -4.41350  -4.29834  -5.68109 
 (2.21440)*  (2.35911)+  (2.46264)* 
D2 -24.74370  -33.50821  -36.35656 
 (20.53043)  (21.83501)  (24.79103) 
Ln_the:Constant# -13.12033  -14.94235  -15.54573 
 (1.11696)**  (0.97716)**  (1.13209)** 
Total consumption per capita     0.00212   
   (0.00040)**   
Linear prediction of consumption per  capita      0.00382 
     (0.00390) 
Constant 12.26913  9.19071  14.22330 
 (4.58157)**  (4.81076)+  (4.76158)** 
Observations 457  420  315 
Robust standard errors in parentheses       
+ significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%       
# indicates parameter of heterogeneity       
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7.3. Comparing the Determinants of Incidence and Duration of Unemployment  
In contrast to the analysis before, here we focus on duration rather than on the hazard rate,. Since we use a piecewise constant hazard, the effect of 
duration is the negative of the effect on the hazard.   
Table 18: Comparing the determinants of incidence and duration of young men 
 Incidence  Duration (*) 
     
Age Positive  concave  Positive concave 
     
Education    
    Primary education  No effect  No effect 
    Junior secondary  Positive effect  Positive effect in the long term  
    Senior secondary  Positive effect  Negative effect in the long term  
    Tertiary  No effect  No effect 
     
Ethnicity No  effect  Oromo has negative effect (but not for spells started before 1991) 
     
Health No  effect  No effect 
     
Location  Addis has negative effect 
Local unemployment rate has positive effect (+) 
Addis has no effect 
Local unemployment rate has positive effect 
     
Household Background     
    Mother’s education  Positive small effect  Positive effect in the long term 
    Father’s profession  Formal sector wage work has positive effect 
Public sector work has positive effect 
Self-employed has negative effect 
Civil service has negative effect in the long term 
Self employment has negative effect in the long term  
    Father’s employment status  Father unemployed has weak positive effect (+)  Unemployment has immediate positive effect 
    Household welfare  Negative effect  Negative effect 
     
Job Aspiration  Aspiring to a public sector job has positive effect 
Aspiring to be self-employed has a negative effect 
Aspiring to a public sector job has positive effect 
Aspiring to be self-employed has a negative effect 
    
Search Medium  Job search through government agency has positive effect 
Job search by asking employer directly has negative effect 
Job search through advertisement has positive effect 
Job search through relatives and friends has negative effect 
Job search by asking employer directly has negative effect 
 
     
Other processes     
   Married  Negative relationship  Negatively related 
   Household head  Negative relationship No  relationship 
   Household composition and size  No relationship  No relationship 
   Household migration  No relationship  No relationship 
   Household labour supply  Number of other unemployed is positively correlated 
Mother working as self-employed or in domestic work is positively correlated 
No relationship with other unemployed in the household 
Mother in self employment or domestic work is positively related 
     
(*) The effect on duration is the negative of the effect on the hazard               (+) Result not discussed in main text 
 
 